Nuclear Power Plant Security and Vulnerabilities

CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Nuclear Power Plant Security and Vulnerabilities Mark Holt Specialist in Energy Policy Anthony Andrews … More on this page … in Energy and Energy Infrastructure Policy March 18, 2009 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL34331 Nuclear Power Plant Security and Vulnerabilities Congressional Research Service Summary The physical security of nuclear power plants and their vulnerability to deliberate acts of terrorism was elevated to a national security …
The physical security of nuclear power plants and their vulnerability to deliberate acts of terrorism was elevated to a national security concern following the September 11, 2001 attacks. Since then, Congress has repeatedly focused oversight and legislative attention on nuclear power plant security requirements established and enforced by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) imposed specific criteria for NRC to consider in revising the “Design Basis Threat” (DBT), which specifies the maximum severity of potential attacks that a nuclear plant’s security force must be capable of repelling. In response to the legislative mandate, NRC revised the DBT (10 C.F.R. Part 73.1) on April 18, 2007. Among other changes, the revisions expanded the assumed capabilities of adversaries to operate as one or more teams and attack from multiple entry points. To strengthen nuclear plant security inspections, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 act required NRC to conduct “force-on-force” security exercises at nuclear power plants at least once every three years. In these exercises, a mock adversary force from outside a nuclear plant attempts to penetrate the plant’s vital area and simulate damage to key safety components. The first three- year cycle of force-on-force exercises was completed for all U.S. nuclear plants at the end of calendar year 2007. During that period, 172 force-on-force exercises were conducted (an average of three per site), and 10 security inadequacies were cited. Two of the exercises, both in 2007, resulted in simulated damage or destruction of a vital target by the adversary team. In both cases, NRC ordered corrective actions and conducted follow-up exercises to confirm the improvements. The Energy Policy Act also included provisions for fingerprinting and criminal background checks of security personnel, their use of firearms, and the unauthorized introduction of dangerous weapons…..
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